In this video it explains how Lorraine Brown was federally charged for her role in a illegal foreclosure scheme. LPS DEFAULT TITLE AND CLOSING COMPANY ARE ON THE FORGED DOCUMENTS USED TO Steal Barbara Bratton’s HOME.

Via the book The Foreclosure Echo How the Hardest Hit Have Been Left out Of The Economic Recovery.

As you will see later with the documents provided. LPS’s name was all over the fraudulent documents USED TO ILLEGALLY STEAL Barbara Bratton’s HOME.

South Hills Properties, LLC

SHP was incorporated on the 19th of June 2006 (almost 16 years ago) by Charles Karich. On October 29th, 2008 Barbara Bratton’s first contact with SHP’s was when a person from their company was taking pictures of her home. SHP’s FRAUDULENTLY pretends to be retained by US Bank to manage the property when in reality they are retained by Select Portfolio Servicing.

 Straight from their website SHP states, If you’re a lending institution or bank looking for a company with impressive credentials to handle your REO properties from assignment to closing, check out our experienced team credentials. 

Within One Week Of Meeting SHP It Just So Happens That Barbara Bratton’s Home Was Purchased As A REALTOR OWNED PROPERTY.

San Bernardino County Board of Supervisors

CAL. GOV’T. CODE 27388 4(d) The county board of supervisors shall annually review the effectiveness of the district attorney in deterring, investigating, and prosecuting real estate fraud crimes based upon information provided by the district attorney in an annual report. The district attorney shall submit the annual report to the board on or before September 1 of each year.

If the San Bernardino County Board of Supervisors were following the law, they would know how many people have lost their home in unlawful detainer court and the actual effectiveness of the district attorney. We at RHEMA believe that there are no answers to any of these simple questions mandated by law because all of these departments in San Bernardino County are all conspired to deceive the public out of their homes, equity, and dignity.  This is an email between A member of RHEMA and the San Bernardino Board of Supervisors.

 CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE  SEC. 27388

The San Bernardino County BOS has not annually reviewed the effectiveness of the DA ever. We know this because there is no documentation whatsoever, LIKE THERE SHOULD BE.

San Bernardino County Recorder’s Office- Bob Dutton

San Bernardino County Sherrif’s

The San Bernardino County Sherrif’s  role in this is that they are in total compliance with the unlawful detainer courts illegal eviction orders. They use threats of forced entry, conspire with neighbors, and overall terrorize law abiding citizens. They finish the fraudulent conveyance through illegal eviction and lockout. They’re the last piece of the puzzle. Once they get the person out of their home, their equity is stripped and sold to an investor and straw buyers occupy the house without CLEAR TITLE.

San Bernardino County Unlawful Detainer Court

Flawed Paperwork Aggravates a Foreclosure Crisis

“Problems emerging in courts across the nation are varied but all involve documents that must be submitted before foreclosures can proceed legally. Homeowners, lawyers and analysts have been citing such problems for the last few years, but it appears to have reached such intensity recently that banks are beginning to re-examine whether all of the foreclosure papers were prepared properly.”

In some cases, documents have been signed by employees who say they have not verified crucial information like amounts owed by borrowers. Other problems involve questionable legal notarization of documents, in which, for example, the notarizations predate the actual preparation of documents — suggesting that signatures were never actually reviewed by a notary.

On still other important documents, a single official’s name is signed in such radically different ways that some appear to be forgeries. Additional problems have emerged when multiple banks have all argued that they have the right to foreclose on the same property, a result of a murky trail of documentation and ownership.

Harris’s task force even wrote up a sample complaint of the laws they found violated by banks and mortgage servicers. She did not want to bring what many believed warranted a big case with big names even with the valid information of fraud she had.

LEAKED MEMO

obtained by The Intercept alleges that One West BANK rushed delinquent homeowners out of their homes by violating notice and waiting period statutes, illegally backdated key documents, and effectively gamed foreclosure auctions.

ONEWEST BANK, WHICH Donald Trump’s nominee for treasury secretary, Steven Mnuchin, ran from 2009 to 2015, repeatedly broke California’s foreclosure laws during that period, according to a previously undisclosed 2013 memo from top prosecutors in the state attorney general’s office.

In the memo, the leaders of the state attorney general’s Consumer Law Section said they had “uncovered evidence suggestive of widespread misconduct” in a yearlong investigation. In a detailed 22-page request, they identified over a thousand legal violations in the small subsection of OneWest loans they were able to examine, and they recommended that Attorney General Kamala Harris file a civil enforcement action against the Pasadena-based bank. But Harris’s office, without any explanation, declined to prosecute the case.

Why did her office close the case, deciding not to “conduct a full investigation of a national bank’s misconduct and provide a public accounting of what happened,” as her own investigators had urged? Although we do not know for sure, everything in its totality appears to show that if Harris’s office prosecuted Steve Mnuchin she arguably would not have become the Vice President of the United States.

Via the law review article above, Prior to subprime lending and mortgage securitization, banks were genuinely concerned about the financial status of their borrowers because the bank itself was incurring a real risk by extending credit. However, this system of having “skin in the game” would soon fade away as banks and financial institutions found innovative ways to unload mortgages and thereby shift the risk in the long term and obtain upfront capital in the short term.

The mortgage lending abuses that led to the housing crisis were born out of a combination of subprime lending and the securitization of mortgages. Both of these together helped form the basis for a system that would ultimately speed toward a crashing and disastrous end.

SUBPRIME LENDING-STACKING THE DECK

Beginning in or around the early 1990s, individuals who lacked the ability to qualify for credit under customary underwriting standards were nevertheless granted mortgage loans by banks across the country. These subprime borrowers—who almost always failed to understand the nature of the documents they were signing or the obligations they were incurring—were enticed to enter into these credit agreements by promises of low interest rates on the front end, which would only adjust to a higher rate a few years into the term of the loan- This is exactly what happened to Barbara Bratton!

Although these borrowers lacked the ability to make their mortgage payments once the interest rates spiked, they often thought they would be able to refinance their debt for another low interest rate before that time would arrive. Under these auspices, subprime mortgage lending flourished such that “subprime mortgages grew from five percent to over twenty percent of all new mortgages” between the years 1994 to 2004.

Mortgage Securitization – Building The House of Cards

The securitization process involved a labyrinthine scheme of buying, selling, swapping, and insuring intricate—and almost always poorly conceived—legal instruments that comprised a host of mortgage/credit rights through various nominees of the true parties. This system started with the lending institution that initially made the loan to the borrower. This could be either a Banking institution or a mortgage broker, in either case, this party was called the MORTGAGE ORIGINATOR.

The originator would, nominally at least, review the credit history, employment status, and other financial indicators of the borrower and assess whether the prospective borrower had the ability to repay the loan. It was at this stage of the transaction that subprime borrowers— those who, by all accounts, could not repay the loan—were nevertheless approved for credit. The borrower would receive the purchase funds in the form of loan proceeds and would contemporaneously sign a promissory note and a mortgage on the property.

Next, almost immediately, the mortgage originator would sell the mortgage and the note to a third party called an issuer or an arranger. These arrangers would purchase hundreds and thousands of mortgages and notes from various mortgage originators from across the country and, by combining them together, created a form of security (like stock or a bond) that could then be bought, sold, or traded on the open market to third party investors, typically through buying a nominal interest in a trust that would have ownership of the mortgage pool A.K.A (GREED).

From this point, although nothing had changed in terms of the borrower’s position, the mortgage payments no longer were directed at the originator. Rather, the third-party investors who purchased interests in the securitized pool of mortgages rely upon yet another third party—a mortgage-servicing agent—to handle the monthly collection of note payments and to otherwise deal directly with the borrower.

Naturally, the ability of mortgage lenders to off-load their risk to third parties almost immediately upon making the risky loan removed a major protection for borrowers. Under historical lending practices the bank assumed the risk that a default might occur if the borrower was unable to pay. Due to this risk, banks were very concerned about the credit worthiness of their borrowers, since a failure to adequately assess a borrower’s financial position could result in a direct hit to the bank.

With the ability to sell the loan immediately after making it, this borrower protection, originally built into the system of lending, was completely eviscerated. A bank need not worry about the quality of the borrower since a subsequent default would be someone else’s problem.

This was especially true since in the early years of adjustable rate subprime loans the borrower was indeed able to make the monthly payments. It would not be until about two to three years into the loan, when the originator bank had long since sold the loan to a third party, that the rate would adjust and become too high for the borrower to make the debt service. And to add yet another defective wheel to the cart, the mortgage servicer who was charged with dealing with the borrower—including addressing any issues that may arise if the borrower became behind on his payments—was financially incentivized by virtue of the servicing agreement to work in favor of neither the interest of the borrower nor the owner of the loan.

The Housing Bubble’s Burst—When It All Came Crashing Down

This defective system, underpinned by greed and buttressed by artificial home prices, finally came crashing down beginning in 2006. As property values decreased, subprime borrowers, who up until now believed they could refinance their debt before the adjustable interest rates spiked, found themselves unable to do so. Because they could not continue to enjoy their relatively low monthly payments, and because they could not sustain these now adjusted and much higher debt obligations, they defaulted en masse. In turn, banks—or, rather, their mortgage servicers—began to foreclose on these defaulted properties across the United States. However, because these properties were underwater—meaning that the mortgage debt encumbering these properties was far in excess of the actual value of the property that it secured—foreclosure sales failed to bring in an amount sufficient for the banks to recover their loss.

As a result, banks were forced to purchase the mortgaged property themselves, which thereby created a situation where lending institutions became the owners of a massive number of foreclosed properties—a role for which they were entirely unfit and unprepared.

Since borrowers were no longer making payments under their loans, the market for the many mortgage-backed securities that were now in the hands of various financial institutions, pension funds, and other investors came crashing down. In essence, these mortgage-backed securities that had come to permeate the entire United States economy and reach into every sector became almost valueless.

As the massive wave of defaults swept across the country, lenders were forced to initiate foreclosure proceedings quickly in an attempt to rehabilitate the defaulted properties and sell them to third party purchasers, thereby recouping their losses.

Mortgage lenders were attempting to create a sort of nation-wide system of real estate transfers through the mortgage securitization system

Since the process of foreclosing on property is so elaborate and requires the observance of so many requirements, foreclosing lenders are charged with conducting a great deal of due diligence and exercising great prudence before initiating such proceedings against a defaulting borrower. “These procedures reflect the need to assure that ownership rights in property are neither extinguished nor created in an environment with inadequate legal circumscriptions.”

As a general matter, the foreclosing party must ensure that (1) they have the legal authority to enforce the mortgage, that they (2) have the correct description of the mortgaged property, (3) that the actions of the borrower validly constitute a default and therefore trigger a right to foreclose, (4) and that the proper parties who are entitled to notice of the foreclosure according to state law and constitutional due process considerations are served. Any defect in the process or failure to follow the necessary procedural steps can result in an illegal foreclosure.

In order to accommodate this DEFECTIVE SYSTEM and thereby still allow lenders to foreclose on their mortgage, courts began allowing the submission of AFFIDAVITS whereby the foreclosing party would swear to the court, under oath, that it was indeed the legal title holder of the promissory note and had the full authority to foreclose on the property.

This abbreviated procedure was dependent upon the assumption that the foreclosing party had conducted the necessary due diligence to ensure that the information to which they were swearing in the affidavit was indeed correct. This would involve going through various documents, assignments, MERS records, and records contained in the various state recording systems to ensure that title to the debt could be validated.

MERS CONNECTION TO SUB-PRIME LOANS AND SECURITIZATION

Before 1995, typically a qualified home buyer applied for a mortgage loan (whole-loan) with his/her local bank, credit union or savings and loan. The credit-worthy borrower agreed to make payments until the mortgage debt was paid in full. Around 1995, a new breed of loan came into play—the sub-prime loan. These loans (often times for one hundred percent or more of the market value of the residential property and no longer dependent upon a borrower’s credit worthiness) changed the landscape of mortgage banking, leading, in part, to the current foreclosure crisis.

Knowing that their borrowers were not credit worthy and that the borrowers’ home mortgages would almost certainly end in default, mortgage lenders unloaded these loans as quickly as possible to large institutional banks. These banks, in turn, bought and sold the loans amongst themselves and subsequently pooled them into trusts and then converted them into mortgage backed securities (also referred to as collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”), meaning that the asset behind the paper is real property). These CDOs were bought and sold by and to investors. Mortgage-backed securities were almost uniformly rated AAA or Aaa by Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poors. The AAA rating was appealing to risk adverse investors and these mortgage backed securities ended up in conservative pension funds such as CalPERS and conservative investment brokerage funds owned by companies such as MetLife, Blackrock, Inc. and Allstate.

WHAT IS WRONG WITH MERS?

After the financial collapse of 2008, MERS began foreclosure actions on behalf of lenders. The creation of MERS allowed mortgage companies to list MERS as the proxy for the true mortgage holder in local government records and to record subsequent changes of ownership in the MERS system only.

Homeowners are arguing that MERS does not have a right to initiate foreclosure actions because MERS does not hold the title and the corresponding note to their properties. These same homeowners are also arguing that the MERS system does not accurately show which lender holds the trust deed for title on the foreclosed property. Furthermore, even if MERS forecloses a property for a lender (that does not actually have title and the corresponding note to the property), an argument could be made that the lender may be prohibited from reselling the property because the lender cannot sell that which it does not own. According to (past)court rulings, there may be no standing to foreclose without proof of title and the note, there may be no standing to foreclose. See U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 44 (Mass. 2011); In re Agard, 444 B.R. 231, 254 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011).

MERS has acknowledged, and recent cases have held, that MERS is a mere nominee—an entity appointed by the true owner simply for the purpose of holding property in order to facilitate transactions. Recent court opinions stress that this defect is not just a procedural one but is also a substantive failure, one that is fatal to the plaintiff’s ability to foreclose. MERS was set up without considering how it would destroy or seriously dilute accurate and recorded chain of title records in event of mass foreclosure. Already, chains of title have been lost in the frenzy of trading and packaging these mortgages into mortgage-backed securities. Today, MERS servicers and related foreclosure mills are literally breaking a centuries-old custom that protected property rights by requiring every sale of property to be publicly recorded (pursuant to race/notice statutes) and requiring that any creditor claiming a right to foreclose demonstrate clear title (with an endorsed note in the creditor’s name and a record at the county office showing transfer of the property).

Subsequently, homeowners can no longer search public records to find out who holds their mortgage because the record shows MERS as the mortgage holder and/or the purchaser of the foreclosed property, even though financial entities may act as a trustee to transactions. Chain of title may become lost due to its inability to be traced amongst the hundreds of thousands of MERS transactions. In the event the chain of title is lost (or at least diluted), MERS has a negative effect on the mortgaged homes, and each adjoining property adjacent to those homes, including those without a mortgage. MERS is simply not a viable substitute for the four hundred year old system of publicly recording deeds pursuant to race/notice statutes in county records offices that make the deeds available for anyone to reference in determining property rights.